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A sales representative from Megastint approached Dr A. Krasia with an offer to financially support future educational
conferences and allow his institution to be a training center if he participates in a new study comparing an old product to
a recently approved and more expensive one. Dr Krasia and his department currently use Megastint’s products. The
medical center’s utilization committee must approve the addition of more expensive pharmaceuticals, devices, or
equipment, and Dr Krasia is the chair. How should Dr Krasia respond to Megastint’s offer of financial support and to
become a training center?
A. Accepting gifts from commercial sources is always wrong.
B. Educational funding by faculty clinical practice needs to be supplemented by commercial sources.
C. Since the institution already uses Megastint’s products, there is no conflict.
D. Physicians with any decision-making power over purchases are compromising their fiduciary duties to patients and
their institutions by accepting directed industrial funding.
E. If Dr Krasia’s decision-making role is small and the gift is not to his direct benefit, the conflict is negligible.
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pUnfortunately the game of medicine is played [from the
standpoint of the patient] with the cards under the table.
—Sir Clifford Allbutt
Many medical organizations recently have examined
the morality of physician–industry relations. However, the
upcoming colossal tab the “Affordable Healthcare Act” will
carry has focused government bureaucracy on health care
delivery. “It took longer than expected, but the Obama
administration is finally poised to enact badly needed reg-
ulations requiring that the manufacturers of drugs, medical
devices and medical supplies disclose all payments they
make to doctors or teaching hospitals. The information,
which would be posted on a government Web site, will
allow patients to decide whether they need to worry about
any possible conflicts of interest” is the opening paragraph
from an article in the January 21, 2012, issue of the New
York Times. This emphasizes the concern that individual
physicians, despite policy statements by major medical in-
stitutions, are likely not to be taking proper ethical mea-
sures in dealing with industrial conflicts of interests.
The role of physician as fiduciary has been an essential
part of the essential medical, and especially surgical, per-
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1810ona for centuries. How else could one allow another to
ear one’s most private secrets, examine one’s most private
ody parts—some the patient has never seen—and be a
ajor guidance on life and death issues? Society grants no
uch privilege to any other group. Physicians of every faith,
thnicity, and nationality over the past few centuries have
arned the respect required by embracing a fiduciary role.
The word fiduciary comes from the Latin feducia,
eaning “to trust.” It was a “right transferred in trust” that
as necessary for complete valuation of a common cur-
ency, such as the Roman denarius, as representing a value
bove its mineral content, the implication being that phy-
icians are worthy of patients trusting medical treatment
ith their most cherished possession—their life—being the
nte. Thus, fiduciary is not just a word defining an appro-
riate professional behavior; it also defines professional
haracter, especially professional integrity.
Fiduciary obligations to patients can come into con-
ict with the surgeon’s self-interest, resulting in conflicts
f interest. Economic conflicts of interests occur when
he self-interest of the surgeon is financial, as in this case.
s a rule, the preservation of professional integrity re-
uires that conflicts of interest be managed in favor of
ulfilling fiduciary obligations. Health care organizations
an also have conflicts of interest, that is, conflicts between
he health care organization’s obligation to see that appro-
riate clinical care is provided to all of its patients, on the
ne hand, and the organization’s self-interest, on the other.
his case involves conflicts of interest both for Dr Krasia
nd for his department.
Waud, in a classic paper decrying gifts from industry to
hysicians, termed the practice “bribery,” for physicians
rder the products; they do not pay for them.1 At first, Dr
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necessary to delineate “bribery.” Merriam-Webster defines
bribe as, “[1.] Money or favor given or promised [2.] to
influence the judgment or conduct of a person [3.] in a
position of trust.” Voila!—bribery.
The topic of physician’s relationships with industry
struck a nerve several years ago, prompting two of the most
influential medical and multiple subspecialty organizations
to study it. The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of
the American Medical Association (AMA) and the execu-
tive committee of the American Association of Medical
Colleges (AAMC) presented strongly worded reports
against industry gifting individuals and recommended
against support for medical educational projects.2 The re-
ports received mixed reviews, being rejected by the AMA
and approved by the AAMC.
Health care delivery requires multiple components:
physicians and medical facilities (the dispensers); the med-
ical products industry (the product suppliers); the insur-
ance industry (the resource generators); and even govern-
ment, and their complex relations (in all three functions).
Health care delivery and improvement necessitates interac-
tions of physicians and medical industry. Both are neces-
sary. So what is the problem?
It [medical industry] may or may not operate immorally
within its moral system, but it has a system of business
morals that is far removed from our medical fiduciary
moral system. The goal of industry is not limited to
making enough money to “continue . . . endeavors.” A
for-profit business exists for profit. Success in business is
therefore gauged by the amount of profit. Not in medi-
cine: our success is gauged by how well our patients do.3
The moral line is set by professional integrity. Dr Krasia
needs to ask himself whether a objective observer would
reliably conclude that accepting the funding from Me-
gastint would compromise either the physician’s profes-
sional fiduciary role or the obligation of the health care
organization to meet its responsibilities to its patients. A
key ethical consideration is the intensity of the conflicts of
interests. What percent of the department’s education bud-
get does the Megastint funding represent? The more in-
tense the economic conflict of interest the less likely a
reasonable observer—and, therefore, Dr Krasia—should
expect its biasing effects to be resisted. The ancient Greek
philosophers had a name for this problem, akrasia, or the
inclination to act against one’s considered judgments be-
cause of self-interest. The danger against which Dr Krasia must
inoculate himself and his department is self-deception: the belief
that he and his colleagues are beyond temptation and therefore
can responsibly manage the conflict of interest embedded in the
offer from Megastint. Maybe not. Hence, the need to under-
take the critical assessment of the conflict of interest.
Option A, an absolutist position, is too austere. Medi-
cine, for well over a century, has advanced through aartnership with the medical industry; industry produces
roducts that medicine suggests, then tests, certifies, and
ses as tools to better heal illnesses. Physicians, however,
ust be vigilant because their professionalism, not medical
ndustry’s reputation, is at risk because they choose or reject
ndustry’s offers.
Option B is true but is inadequate justification for
llowing excessive industrial educational intrusions. Medi-
al professionalism is the major firewall protecting patients
rom excesses and inaccuracies in all medical therapies.
ociety and medical industry depend on us to accurately
ulfill that responsibility. Medicine must remain vigilant
bout akrasia to avoid distortions from objectivity, espe-
ially concerning aspects of education, research, and pre-
cribing. It is not just the institution; it is the ethical
esponsibility of the individual prescriber. In this case, both
re using Megastint’s products but Dr Krasia must be able,
ith support of evidence-based reasoning, to conclude that
he more expensive stint justifies the increased cost. Other-
ise he would be profiting from producing data that could
enefit Megastint paid for by others—insurance and pa-
ients.
Option C emphasizes the conflict risk potential inher-
nt in the two moral systems. Dr Krasia is being asked to
ake a decision for profit and must consider whether the
ncreased cost is warranted. The fact that he is dealing
resently with the company has no ethical bearing.
Option E would apply if the gift from Megastint were
ndeed small, for example, a one-time grant without restric-
ion for a conference. But it is not. Option E therefore does
ot apply.
The process of elimination leaves us option D, as does
thical reasoning. This option expresses a universal caution
n the necessary industry–physician dealings that can bene-
t patients or can, as almost all human endeavors, get
idetracked. Managing this caution requires Dr Krasia to
arefully assess the nature and intensity of the conflict of
nterest. To protect professional and organizational integ-
ity, the burden of proof should be put on accepting the
unding. To protect against akrasia, this should not be a
udgment reached by Dr Krasia alone, but by a committee
hose deliberations should be reviewed and approved by
he senior administration of the health care organization,
ith Dr Krasia abstaining. In surgery we intensely study for
ears mastering what to do, but it is equally important to
earn what we should not do.
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